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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to test the computational properties,
rates of convergence, and feasibility of implementing four multiple
criteria, decomposition algorithms or organizational models. The orga-
nizational models recently proposed by Ruefli, Freeland, Davis, and Davis
and Whitford were tested on a large university resource allocation
problem. Each of the algorithms was implemented on a CDC CYBER-175 com-
puter. With the exception of the Ruefli model, the algorithms performed
well, albeit some better than others. Convergence was rapid, and the
models' solutions were reasonable. The results of the study indicate
that these organizational models can offer a reasonable approach to allo-
cating resources in real world hierarchical organizations.

Resource Allocation in a University Environment: A Test
of the Ruefli, Freeland, and Davis Goal Programming
Decomposition Algorithms
I. Introduction
During the last several years, scholars in the fields of economics,
organizational behavior, and operations research have made great strides
in developing models that address themselves to issues of economic
agency and its implications [1, 23, 24, and 34], organizational struc-
ture and control processes [3, 5, 13, 19, 20, 28, and 29], and mathema-
tical decomposition algorithms [6, 9, 18, 25, and 30]. One of the many
goals of these separate studies has been to understand the role that
organizational design and information processing play in economic deci-
sion making and resource allocation.
In reviewing a number of studies in this area, Ruefli [27, p. 361]
states:
...perhaps the most discouraging aspect of the
subject we are considering is the persistent lack
of applications. Modeling efforts usually take
place at the theoretical level, and little has been
done to link these efforts to actual problem situa-
tions and actual (or even strongly representative)
data.
The purpose of this research is to fill this void. It will focus
upon four, three-level hierarchical, decomposition algorithms developed
by Ruefli [25, 26], Freeland [16, 18] (also see Free land-Baker [17]),
Davis [9], and Davis and Whitford [10] and will test their computational
properties, rates of convergence, and feasibility of implementation in
a university resource allocation setting. A companion paper by the
authors [10] analyzes the mathematical structure of these algorithms.
Section II will provide an overview of the demographic and economic
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environments in which universities must operate. Also it will provide
a justification for using a multicriteria, hierarchical model for allo-
cating a university's resources. Section III gives an outline of the
organizational and algebraic structure of the university resource allo-
cation model. Section IV presents the results of computational tests
utilizing a family of multicriteria, decomposition models. A final
section gives a summary of the paper, provides concluding remarks, and
outlines areas for future research.
II. The University Setting—An Overview
It is quite probable that universities and colleges in the United
States will soon enter a no-growth or negative-growth era. For example,
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) has predicted [15]
that the number of bachelor's degrees to be granted in 1986-87 by all
U.S. colleges and universities will fall below the number awarded in
1976-77. Moreover, NCES projects that the population of traditional
college age students will shrink dramatically beyond the mid 1980's.
As an example, the combined enrollment of U.S. elementary and secondary
schools in 1976-77 was 49.3 million students. NCES forecasts an 8.3%
drop in enrollment to 45.2 million by 1986-87.
In addition to these demographic shifts, universities will likely
have to cope with continuing inflation and lagging financial resources.
Given this scenario, underlying conflicts among a university's colleges,
schools, and departments are apt to surface, thereby exacerbating
resource allocation difficulties. In this setting the status quo will
be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. Individual programs nay
have to be abandoned or reduced to accommodate financial constraints.
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Haphazard attempts to cope with problems of resource allocation in this
demographic and economic environment are likely to be disastrous.
It is well established that optimal transfer prices and resource
allocation within a for-profit divisionalized corporation must consider
all corporate opportunity costs and constraints [12]. Clearly if one is
to persue reasonable policies in allocating a university's resources,
all organizational opportunity costs and constraints must be considered
simultaneously.
The overall organizational structure of a typical university and its
subordinate colleges and departments is markedly similar to the hier-
archical organization of most multi-division profit maximizing corpora-
tions. However, unlike for-profit organizations, a university cannot
point to a single criterion, such as profit or shareholder wealth
maximization, that can adequately measure economic efficiency. Instead
institutions of higher education have multiple and often conflicting
goals. Thus the decomposition algorithms such as those developed by
Dantzig and Wolfe [6] and Ten Kate [30] which focus upon a single cri-
terion seem inappropriate in this setting. Instead a multicriteria
approach appears more appropriate. Indeed, the university planning
literature is replete with studies which advocate a goal programming
technique which strives to get as close as possible to a stated set of
organizational objectives or goals. See [14, 21, and 31] for a limited
sample. Accordingly the Ruefli, Freeland, and Davis algorithms which
incorporate both hierarchical decomposition and goal programming appear
to offer great promise in handling the budgeting dilemma faced by uni-
versity administrators. This study will investigate and evaluate these
i
models.
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III. Specification of the University Model
The university planning model presented In this study focuses upon
university resource allocation over a one academic year horizon and is
based upon the organization depicted in Figure 1. Georgia State Univer-
sity (GSU) served as the structuring guide for the institution presented
in this study, and it should be noted that some of the model's charac-
teristics do not conform to the actual organizational structure at GSU.
However, the model is strongly representative of GSU's two largest
colleges.
The primary focus of the model's formulation was the academic units
of the university. The intent was to isolate the effects and inter-
actions of student demand, educational quality, and fiscal responsibility
upon the university's staffing for academic Instruction, research, and
public service. Problems of providing incremental or decremental
administrative and support services such as building maintenance, phy-
sical security, and major additions to computer, laboratory, library,
classroom, and office capacities and resources were not directly
included in the model. From an economic perspective many of these
requirements are "sunk" or "fixed" commitments. By omitting these ser-
vices, one might infer that their current level is considered optimal;
however, such a conclusion Is unwarranted. By treating the funding of
these "sunk, cost" resources as a minimum goal, sensitivity analysis
utilizing funding deviations or reallocation alternatives could easily
evaluate the potential trade-offs of these fixed commitments. An
The formulation described in this section is a one year version
of a much larger and more complex three year planning horizon model
described in Whitford [32, 33].
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overview of the university, college, and department problems is pre-
sented below.
The University, College, and Department Problems
For operational purposes the university is assumed to have six per-
formance goals. These goals relate to the university's discretionary
budget, graduate and undergraduate unfulfilled student demand, minimum
levels of university-wide undergraduate core course offerings, and
faculty composition. In the decomposition framework the colleges
review the operating decisions generated by their subordinate depart-
ments and submit revised coordination information, transfer prices
and/or performance goals, based upon external university and internal
college policies.
A. Internal Goals and Policies
Because the majority of a university's course offerings are part of
internal college programs, it was not necessary to superimpose external
university constraints upon all departmental minimum course offerings.
However, there was a need to specify that internal college programs
were adequately staffed and funded. To accomplish this, three internal
goal sets were imposed; they controlled the colleges' doctoral programs
and tenure decisions.
An internal goal relating to doctoral seminars was included for
several reasons. Viable doctoral programs can provide opportunities
and incentives to faculty members to become involved in research and
to remain current in their areas of specialization. Also Ph.D. stu-
dents can augment departmental teaching lines, and outstanding doctoral
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candidates tend to reflect favorably upon the university thereby
attracting top faculty and students. Unfortunately because most doc-
toral seminars have small enrollments and are often taught by the best
qualified and most highly paid faculty, doctoral programs may not be
cost effective. Unless minimum goals were placed upon these seminar
offerings, they might not be offered.
The final two internal goals and constraints were related to the
granting of tenure. It was felt that including a potential for incor-
porating promotions, and/or the hiring outstanding, tenured faculty
would greatly enhance the planning model. These constraints were not
intended to evaluate faculty productivity, but were incorporated as a
means to determine the budgetary implications and faculty composition
the result from a selected set of tenure policies.
3. External Goals
Each college's problem contained a set of constraints that linked
its subordinate departments with university goals. These are targeted
at meeting the university stipulated budget, unfulfilled undergraduate
and graduate demand, faculty composition, and minimum core course
offering goals.
In a decentralized setting, top management is typically interested
in the big picture rather than the intricacies of operating details.
However, as one moves down the organizational hierarchy, it becomes
necessary to consider many operating interactions in detail. Unfor-
tunately, because of space limitations, only a brief overview of the
departmental problems can be presented. However, a detailed descrip-
tion is available in [32, pp. 81-107].
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C. Departmental Decision Variables
The principal components of the departmental problems are the number,
level, and size of course offerings and the type and quality of staffing
positions teaching those courses. To link these components each depart-
ment has seven, full time equivalent (FTE) levels for staff and faculty
positions as well as seven levels of course offerings. The staff and
faculty variable levels were: (1) secretarial and research associate
personnel, (2) graduate student research assistants, (3) graduate student
teaching assistants, (4) instructors (nonterminal degree), (5) assistant,
(6) associate (tenured), and (7) full (tenured) professors. The course
offering levels were: (1) freshman-sophomore core, (2) junior-senior
core, (3) junior-senior major-minor, (4) graduate (masters) core, (5)
graduate (masters) major, (6) graduate (doctorate) core, and (7) grad-
uate (doctorate) major courses. Also, associated with these course
levels are seven variables that capture unfulfilled course demand.
Finally, departmental budgets composed of salaries and indirect costs
were included as decision variables.
D. Departmental Operating Constraints and Goals
Each departmental formulation incorporated five categories of
operating constraints: (a) class size and enrollments, (b) teaching
loads and levels, (c) secretarial and research support, (d) direct and
indirect budgetary expenses, and (e) tenure obligations. These incor-
porate university policy in regard to average class size and pro-
fessorial teaching levels for the seven course levels offered within
the departments. In addition these policy constraints specify that
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courses offered at various levels cannot exceed the pool of faculty
capable of teaching at that level. For example, only professors are
allowed to teach doctoral courses; however, as the pool of course
offerings expands to include the freshman-sophomore level all teaching
levels are included.
Each department's problem included constraints which provide minimum
and maximum levels of secretarial and departmental administrative sup-
port, and levied maximum and minimum levels for departmental graduate
student-research assistant support. Each problem also contained equa-
tions which defined departmental salaries, minimum and maximum indirect
cost levels, and a total departmental budget. Finally constraints
which insured that tenure obligations were fulfilled were incorporated.
E. Organizational Priorities and Goal Directions' Weightings
A comparison of the Ruefli, Freeland, and Davis algorithms reveals
the key role played by the goal deviations' penalty weightings in deter-
mining the eventual allocation of resources. See [10] for an in depth
comparison of these organizational models. The intricacies of the uni-
versity model's weightings are rather cumbersome, and because they are
given elsewhere [32], only a few details are provided here. First, the
weights assigned to both colleges' budget overrun deviations were equal
and received the highest weighting. Accordingly, neither college had a
relative advantage in terras of budgetary bargaining power or bureaucra-
tic political clout. There were differences in the other goal deviation
priorities. For example, Business Administration and its departments
tended to place higher priorities on doctoral programs. In contrast,
the College of Arts and Sciences and its departments were more concerned
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with undergraduate programs. These weightings seem entirely rational
in light of the current educational environment characterized by an
oversupply of potential faculty and undersupply of students in the
liberal arts disciplines and the opposite conditions in many Business
Administration fields.
Before describing the results of computational testing, a few points
should be noted. The Davis Generalized Hierarchical Model (GHM) can
incorporate actual cost vectors associated with decision variables at
each level of the decision making hierarchy. Neither the Ruefli nor
Freeland models contained these costs in their objective functions.
Although operating costs and budget expenses are incorporated within
the constraint structure of the university model, they were not directly
inserted in any of the algorithms' objective functions. However, they
were included indirectly via deviations from budgetary goals. Thus the
university model's formulation was compatible with the goal programming
structure of each algorithm. (For an application that includes both
costs and penalty weights assigned to goal deviations, see the design
problem in Davis [8].) Finally, the GHM utilizes a goal programming
structure at each level of its hierarchy. For convenience, the depart-
mental penalty weights, associated with goal deviations at the lowest
level of the organization, were given the same values as corresponding
deviations as their superordinate college.
IV. Computational Testing of the Algorithms
An Overview of the Organizational Models
This section reports on the results of computational tests on a
series of multiple criteria, three-level hierarchical organizational
-11-
models. In total five models were tested: two versions of Ruefli'
s
Generalized Goal Decomposition Model [25, 26] (GGD-I and GGD-II, respec-
tively); the Freeland [16, 18] and Freeland and Baker [17] model (F-B);
the Davis Generalized Hierarchical Model [9] (GHM) ; and finally a hybrid
of the Freeland and Baker and Davis models [10] (F-B/D). Although a
description of the structure of these organizational models is given in
a companion paper [10], a very brief outline of each follows.
The first of the raulticriteria organizational models was developed
by Ruefli [25, 26] over ten years ago. In describing his algorithm,
Ruefli was somewhat ambiguous on exactly what informational flows and
constraints should be incorporated. He suggested [25, p. B510] but
mathematically did not use a convex combination constraint at the middle
or managerial level of the organizational hierarchy. This convex com-
bination constraint would be used to compute a composite proposal vector
for the lowest or operating unit level of the decision-making hierarchy.
Instead, the original GGD allowed each manager to select a proportion,
between zero and one, of the latest proposal vector generated by a given
operating unit. Two unfortunate consequences could result from the
omission of this convex combination constraint. First, the manager's
proposal selection might lie outside the feasible region of an operating
unit's decision space. Second, convergence of the GGD model cannot be
demonstrated. Accordingly, two versions of the GGD formulation were
tested: the original version, GGD-I, and a convex combination version,
GGD-II. The GGD-II model employed convex combination constraints at the
managerial level in order to generate composite proposal vectors.
-12-
The third organizational algorithm applied to the university
resource allocation model was developed by Freeland [16, 18] and
Freeland and Baker [17]. Based upon the results of the Ruefli models,
an additional constraint was added to the middle level problem of their
original formulation. This constraint was identical to the modifica-
tion made to obtain the GGD-II version, and it insured feasibility of
the department's operating proposals.
The fourth organizational model tested was the Davis GHM [9, 32,
33], The solution structure of the GHM differs from the other models
in that it utilizes a goal programming formulation at each level of the
hierarchy. In addition, instead of shadow prices, the GHM focuses upon
goals and goal deviations as coordinative mechanisms.
The final algorithm tested in this research represents a hybrid of
the Freeland-Baker and Davis GHM dubbed the F-B/D model. As seen in
Freeland [18] the original Freeland-Baker model represented a restruc-
turing of Ruefli 1 s GGD formulation. At the highest level of the deci-
sion-making hierarchy, the F-B model included Benders' cutting-plane
formulation [2]. The lowest level was left unchanged. In contrast,
the GHM utilized a goal programming decision structure at each level of
the hierarchy. The F-B/D model incorporates the top two levels of the
Freeland-Baker model in conjunction with the GHM goal programming struc-
ture and essential coordinative Informational flows at the lowest level
of the organization.
Computational Requirements and Methods
The size of the overall problem of the university planning model
presented in the previous section is rather large. In total this problem
-13-
has approximately 2,400 variables and 900 constraints. Because of the
man-hours required to formulate and solve the iterative stages of each
algorithm, it was necessary to write a computer program that could
implement each of the organizational models. These five programs were
coded in FORTRAN and were tested on a Control Data Corporation CYBER-175
computer. The linear programming optimization subroutines for the
various programs utilized a sparce matrix inversion process and were
developed by Marsten [22]. These computer programs offered several
benefits. First, they eliminated the possibility of data manipulation
errors creeping into the informational flows as they were passed from one
subproblera to another. Second, they greatly reduced data input time.
Finally, they provided extraordinary computational speed and ease. For
example compilation of each FORTRAN program required approximately 3.5
seconds of central processing unit (CPU) time. Execution time was also
quite fast. No algorithm required more than 95.3 CPU seconds for
convergence, and some converged in as little as 10.5 CPU seconds.
Results of the University Resource Allocation Model
The results of the computational testing of each algorithm on the
university planning model provided an interesting contrast. In order
to access the efficacy of each algorithm in dealing with various levels
of "managerial indigestion," three versions of the university model were
tested. The first incorporated a total budget ceiling of $8 million;
the second and third had total budget ceilings of $7.5 and $7.0 million,
respectively. Initial analysis indicated that an overall budget of $8.0
was adequate to meet both colleges' programs. However, there was no
-14-
budgetary slack in this highest funding level. As the total budget
level was reduced, the problem of rationing scarce resources became more
significant. And at the $1 million reduction level, budgetary problems
became critical.
Table 1 provides a summary of the results of these tests. Several
interesting and somewhat surprising characteristics appear in Table 1.
First, with the exception of the GGD versions, none of the algorithms
required more than five planning, programming, and budgetary reviews
(iterations) for convergence. These results are even more surprising
when one considers the fact that no hueristic starting procedures were
utilized in any of the models. In fact if one disregards the first
iteration, which is required for model initialization, the number of
iterations required for convergence is markedly similar to those
experienced by most decentralized organizations. When compared with
the results of previous applications [3, 4, 7, 11], these results are
extraordinary.
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of these test results was the
inability of either version of Ruefli's GGD model to provide acceptable
results. Although the objective function values of the GGD-I runs appear
vastly superior to the other models, the underlying results of the GGD-I
runs are disastrous. The previous discussion of the GGD-I and GGD-II
differences indicated that a college's selection of an individual depart-
ment's operating proposals might not be feasible. That is, the proposals
might violate the department's operating constraints. This was preci-
sely what happened in the tests of the GGD-I model. The decisions
generated by GGD-I even at the $8.0 million level suggested that depart-
ments with more than adequate enrollments should shut down their operations.
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By comparison, the operating proposal results of GGD-II were much
better; however, the objective function values of this version indicate
a rather curious pattern. They are identical, regardless of which budget
level was used. This same pattern also appeared in the GGD-I results.
Further a two iteration cycling pattern emerges at iteration six for
GGD-I and iteration seven for GGD-II. Analysis of these versions'
results indicates that one factor is causing both the cycling and equal
objective function value problems. In the discussion of the GGD-II
algorithm, strong emphasis was placed upon the need to incorporate a
convex combination "proposal constraint" at the managerial level.
Ruefli noted [25, p. B510] that it also might be necessary to place a
similar constraint on all previously generated goals. This type of
constraint was not included in the GGD-II version, because as Freeland
[18] has pointed out, it would totally destroy the algorithm's decom-
position structure. Our results indicate that without a convex combina-
tion goal constraint, the GGD-I and II algorithms will cycle between
corner points of the feasible decision space for the highest level of
the decision-making hierarchy. Beyond question, the Ruefli GGD model
was a landmark breakthrough in multi-level, raulticriteria decision-
making. Further, it laid the foundation for each of the models tested
in this study. Unfortunately it appears that a meaningful application
of the GGD model is not possible.
The third row in Table 1 describes the results of the Freeland or
Freeland and Baker (F-B) algorithm. Again it should be noted that -the
version tested in this study incorporated a convex combination constraint
similar to the one employed in GGD-II. This constraint was omitted from
the original version of the F-B model. Initial testing indicated that
-17-
omission of the constraint generated results that were as nonsensical
as those of the GGD-I runs. With the constraints, the model performed
reasonably well. Convergence was rapid; the proposals were deemed rea-
sonable; and cycling was not a problem. However, careful analysis of
the F-B results for the $7.5 million budget reveals a curious pattern.
That is, the value of the objective function for iteration two is less
than those of all subsequent iterations. This anomoly results from
the introduction of new cutting-planes into the university-level problem
at each iteration. The introduction of new constraints or cutting-planes
is important because a previous goal vector could be rendered infeasible
or non-optimal on a subsequent iteration. Even more important is the
fact that once cutting-planes are introduced, they remain for all sub-
sequent iterations. In defining the cutting-planes, the simplex
multipliers from the college level decisions are used. The major con-
cern here is that in the early iterations, these simplex multipliers
may have little or no relation to the overall optimum solution. In
fact, their values may be detrimental to the decomposition process.
Because the F-B model is dependent the procedure used to initiate the
iterative process (i.e., assign initial goals to the college-level
problems), this type of anomoly can exist.
Although the F-B model generated good results, by comparison the
GHM's and F-B/D's solutions were even better. The GHM runs converged
in no more than three iterations, while the F-B/D model needed four for
the $7.5 million funding level and five at the $7.0 level. These models
yielded identical results at the $8.0 budget level. In terms of objec-
tive function values, the GHM outperformed the F-B/D model at the $7.5
million level, while at the $7.0 million level the F-B/D was slightly
better.
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These improved results vis-a-vis the F-B model are attributable to
the goal deviations and performance goals incorporated at the lowest
level of the decision-making hierarchy. When compared with the shadow
prices or dual variables utilized by the other algorithms, the goal
deviations and sequential goal generation techniques incorporated in
the GHM and F-B/D algorithms offer a more attractive and effective
mechanism for coordinating organizational decision-making. On the
other hand, additional testing of the GHM and F-B/D algorithms is
necessary to determine if a Benders' partitioning technique is con-
sistently superior or inferior to the goal deviation-sequential goal
generation technique at the highest level of the decision making hier-
archy. The theoretical results cited in our comparison paper [10],
point to the conclusion that incorporation of a quadratic objective
function within each algorithm could solve many of the difficulties
found in this family of multiple criteria organizational models. If
this is the case, the relative advantage of either the Benders' or goal
deviation-generation technique in a linear model would be a moot issue.
V. Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this research has been to test the computational
properties, rates of convergence, and feasibility of implementing four,
three-level, multicriteria, decomposition models. The organizational
models developed by Ruefli, Freeland (and Freeland and Baker), Davis,
and Davis and Whitford were tested upon a relatively large university
resource allocation problem. Section II provided an overview of the
economic and demographic environment faced by U.S. universities and
provided a justification for using a multiple criteria, decomposition
-19-
approach in a university setting. Section III outlined the structure
and constraints of the university resource allocation model tested in
this study. The model was structured around the two largest colleges
at Georgia State University and contained three hierarchical levels.
The highest level represented the university's administration. The
middle level contained two colleges, Arts and Sciences and Business
Administration. The lowest level contained nineteen departments, eight
subordinate to Arts and Sciences and eleven subordinate to Business
Administration. Section IV described computational tests of the algo-
rithms. Also the fourth section gives a brief overview of the algorithms,
their computational requirements, and solution results. With the excep-
tion of the Ruefli GGD versions, the models performed well. Thus even
in an environment characterized by multiple and conflicting goals, lack
of unaniminity in organizational priorities, and severe financial
restrictions, these organizational models performed well, albeit some
better than others. The number of information exchanges or iterative
reviews required for convergence were relatively few and were strikingly
similar to those experienced by many decentralized organizations. These
convergence results were achieved without heuristic starting procedures.
The relative success of the organizational models tested in this
study does not imply that future research Is unwarranted. Currently
work is in progress that will incorporate a quadratic objective function
optimization option in the FORTRAN computer codes of each algorithm.
It is likely that this type of nonlinear objective function will solve
many of the "nonoptimality" problems associated with this family of
multiple criteria, hierarchical models. " These quadratic results will
be reported as research continues.
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